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Abstract
This paper investigates how a ﬁrm’s borrowing cost evolves as it ages. Using a new data set
of more than 200,000 bank-dependent small ﬁrms for 1997-2002, we ﬁnd the following. First, the
distribution of borrowing costs tends to become less skewed to the right over time, which can be
partially attributed to “selection” (i.e., exits of defaulting ﬁrms reduce the total borrowing costs),
but is mainly explained by “adaptation” (i.e., surviving ﬁrms’ borrowing costs decline as they age).
Second, the selection process is natural in that ﬁrms with lower quality are separated, charged higher
borrowing costs, and eventually forced to exit, which contrasts with the results of previous studies on
Japan’s credit misallocations, such as Peek and Rosengren (2005). Third, in the adaptation process,
we ﬁnd an age dependence of ﬁrms’ borrowing costs even if we control for ﬁrm size.
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What happens to a ﬁrm as it ages? This question has been addressed by a number of studies that
empirically investigate the relationship between a ﬁrm’s age and real activity variables, including the
ﬁrm’s growth, the volatility of its growth, and employment. Evans (1987b), for example, shows that
the growth rate of U.S. small ﬁrms and the volatility of growth are both negatively correlated with ﬁrm
age, while Cabral and Mata (2003), examining Portuguese manufacturing ﬁrms, ﬁnd that the ﬁrm size
distribution moves towards the right hand side as ﬁrms age. Meanwhile, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996), concentrating on U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms, report that the rates of job creation and destruction
decrease with ﬁrm age.1 The purpose of this paper is to search for such “age dependence” in ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial activities rather than in their real activities. Speciﬁcally, we look for it in one of the most
important ﬁnancial variables for ﬁrms: their borrowing cost. Based on a unique panel data set of more
than 200,000 small Japanese ﬁrms covering the period from 1997 to 2002, we provide a careful analysis
of the relationship between ﬁrm age and borrowing cost.
Our study is closely related to that by Diamond (1989), which yielded an important prediction about
the channel through which the borrowing cost distribution evolves with age. Speciﬁcally, Diamond
(1989) investigated entrepreneurs’ dynamic decision making in an environment in which borrowing costs
crucially depend on a borrower’s repayment record: a ﬁrm’s borrowing costs decline over time as long
as the ﬁrm maintains a good track record, while a single default leads to a large increase in the interest
rate charged. Under these circumstances, borrowers with a long good track record tend to choose safe
projects as they do not want to jeopardize this valuable asset, which further reduces their borrowing
costs. One of the objectives of this paper is to examine whether such a negative correlation between age
and borrowing costs among surviving ﬁrms can be found in our data set.2
1Other studies on this topic include those by Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), who report that manufacturing
plants that have been in business longer are less likely to close, and by Brown and Medoﬀ (2003), who ﬁnd a U-shaped
relationship between ﬁrm age and wages.
2Studies other than Diamond’s (1989) that draw a similar conclusion regarding the relationship between age and
borrowing costs include Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Petersen and Rajan (1994).
2Diamond’s model, however, says little about the “selection” channel, which theoretical studies on
ﬁrm dynamics have focused on as a determinant of industry evolution. The reason that Diamond’s
model has little to say about the selection channel simply is that borrowers are assumed to be observa-
tionally equivalent: imperfect information does not allow lenders to distinguish among diﬀerent types
of borrowers, so that all borrowers are lumped together and charged the same interest rate. Given the
absence of any diﬀerence between prospective defaulters and survivors in terms of borrowing costs, it
is almost impossible to say anything about the role of “selection” in the evolution of the borrowing
cost distribution. In this respect, we depart from Diamond’s setting and assume that there are two
diﬀerent channels through which the borrowing cost distribution evolves with ﬁrm age: “selection” and
“adaptation.” Selection aﬀects the evolution of the borrowing cost distribution because prospective
defaulters and survivors are diﬀerent in terms of the interest rates they are charged. If it is true that
nonviable ﬁrms that are later forced to exit from the market through selection pay higher interest rates
than those that survive, we should observe that the average borrowing cost declines over time. On the
other hand, adaptation aﬀects the evolution of the borrowing cost distribution because survivors change
their behavior as they age. Diamond’s “reputation story,” that is, the idea that the interest rate ﬁrms
are charged reﬂects their credit history, is one possible explanation why survivors change their behavior
with age.3
The interest of this paper is threefold. First, we are interested in the relative importance of selection
and adaptation in the evolution of borrowing cost. In this respect, Cabral and Mata (2003) arrive at the
interesting ﬁnding that selection plays a less important role in the evolution of ﬁrm size distribution than
is assumed in the theoretical literature. This result is echoed by Okazaki’s (2004) empirical ﬁnding that
the role of selection did not play the dominant role in the evolution of Japanese main bank relationships.
Second, we are interested in whether the selection we ﬁnd is natural or unnatural. A number of scholars
3Needless to say, the words “selection” and “adaptation” are borrowed from evolutionary biology. We think this analogy
is very useful to highlight what our exercise is about. However, we do not wish to take the analogy further, as we recognize
that there are non-trivial diﬀerences between industrial evolution and biological evolution.
3have argued that the prolonged stagnation of the Japanese economy can be explained by the fact
that ineﬃcient “zombie”ﬁrms were allowed to stay in the market because of the perverse incentives
provided by struggling banks and that the presence of such zombie ﬁrms crowded out new entrants
with proﬁtable investment opportunities, leading to a deterioration in the eﬃciency of the economy
(Cabarello, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2006); Peek (2004); Peek and Rosengren (2005); Nishimura, Nakajima,
and Kiyota (2005)).4 We would like to examine if this unnatural selection story is supported by the
data. The third interest concerns the mechanism of adaptation. As shown empirically by Evans (1987a)
and Hall (1987), among others, ﬁrm size plays an important role in ﬁrm dynamics. Given the positive
association between ﬁrm size and age, this implies that ﬁrm age could be correlated with borrowing costs
by way of ﬁrm size. We would like to distinguish this indirect relationship from the direct relationship
between age and borrowing costs implied by theory, including the reputation story by Diamond (1989).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical approach,
including our methodology to identify the age eﬀect. Section 3 empirically examines the three issues,
that is, selection versus adaptation (section 3.1), natural versus unnatural selection (section 3.2), and
age versus ﬁrm size in the adaptation mechanism (section 3.3). Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Approach
2.1 Data
The data for this study were obtained from the Credit Risk Database (CRD),5 which covers about 60
percent of small corporations in Japan.6 One of the advantage of the CRD is that it contains information
about default events, of which there are four types: payments delinquent by three months or more; de
4In a related context, Cabinet Oﬃce of Japan (2003) claimed that to revitalize the economy, it would be necessary to
close six percent of all large, publicly traded ﬁrms in Japan.
5The CRD was established in 2001 at the initiative of the Small and Medium Enterprises Agency of Japan (SMEA)
in order to provide ﬁnancial institutions with detailed and reliable balance sheet information on small businesses, thereby
enabling ﬁnancial institutions to make an accurate estimate of a ﬁrm’s default probability.
6There were about 1.6 million small and medium-size corporations in Japan as of 2001, of which the CRD covers 0.9
million.
4facto failure; failure; repayment of debts by a loan guarantee corporation. Default information allows
us to identify defaulters and non-defaulters in each year.
Using the more than 5 million ﬁrm-years contained in the CRD, we construct a panel data set as
follows. First, we choose 1997-2002 as the sample period, so that we have enough observations for each
year. Second, we limit the sample to ﬁrms satisfying either of the following two conditions: (1) the ﬁrm
survived from 1997 to 2002 and reported information to the CRD Association in each year; or (2) the
ﬁrm defaulted between 1997 and 2002 and reported information to the CRD until the year of default.
Put diﬀerently, a ﬁrm is not included in our panel data set if it does not report to the CRD Association
in 1997, or if it disappears without a record of default between 1997 and 2002. It should be noted that
ﬁrms established in and after 1998 are not included in our data set. Third, we remove outliers for each
variable based on the following rule. As for interest rates, we ﬁrst remove outliers in the lower tail by
omitting observations with an interest rate that is exactly zero (0.91 percent of the total observations)
and then remove the same percentage of observations in the upper tail. As for other variables (operating
proﬁts, total asset, and net worth), we remove the top and bottom 1 percent of all observations. After
making the above adjustments, we ﬁnally obtain a panel data set whose structure is described in Table
1. The number of ﬁrms is about 240,000 in 1997 and declines by about 8,000 per year,7 ﬁnally reaching
about 200,000 in 2002.
Below we explain the major variables employed in our analysis.
Borrowing Cost: The CRD does not provide the borrowing cost for each individual loan contract.
To calculate the borrowing cost, we divide interest payments for a year by the average of total borrowing
outstanding (including discounted notes receivable) at the end of the current and previous years.
Birth Year and Firm Age: We deﬁne the year when a ﬁrm is registered at the Legal Aﬀairs Bureau
as its birth (cohort) year. The diﬀerence between the current year and the cohort year is the age of the
7The default rates are two to four percent per year.
5ﬁrm. The number of ﬁrms that are very old or very young is quite limited, and thus we mainly focus
on the samples with cohort years between 1950 and 1995.
Operating Proﬁt: This performance variable is used as a measure of ﬁrms’ observable quality. We
deﬁne operating proﬁt as proﬁts divided by the value of total assets outstanding. Note that the operating
proﬁt here is before the payment of interest.
Total Assets and Net Worth: As proxies for ﬁrm size, we employ the following two variables: the
total assets outstanding, and net worth deﬁned as the diﬀerence between total assets and total liabilities.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for these variables. The mean borrowing cost of ﬁrms is 2.83
percent in the overall sample, and there is a substantial diﬀerence in performance between surviving
and defaulting ﬁrms. The performance of defaulting ﬁrms in terms of operating proﬁt is markedly worse
than that of surviving ﬁrms. Furthermore, the size of defaulters is smaller than that of survivors both
in terms of total assets and net worth.
2.2 Identiﬁcation of Age Eﬀects
Let us denote the borrowing cost of ﬁrm i, which belongs to birth cohort group τ, in year t by Ri(t,τ)
and assume that Ri(t,τ) is determined as a conﬂuence of three eﬀects: a year eﬀect α(t), a cohort eﬀect
β(τ), and an age eﬀect γ(t − τ). That is,
Ri(t,τ) = α(t) + β(τ) + γ(t − τ) +  i(t,τ)
where  i(t,τ) represents an idiosyncratic error term. Since there is an exact linear relationship between
these three eﬀects, a serious identiﬁcation problem emerges when we try to extract the age eﬀect. To be
more speciﬁc, any cross-sectional approach inherently contains the confound of age and cohort eﬀects,
while any longitudinal approach contains that of age and year eﬀects. For example, Petersen and Rajan
6(1995) use cross-sectional data to obtain the age proﬁle of ﬁrms in terms of their borrowing costs under
the assumption of “stationarity of the survival process” (p.419); however, if the survival process is not
stationary, we cannot ignore the cohort eﬀect, thereby fail to identify the age eﬀect from the confound
of age and cohort eﬀects.8
It is easy to see that cross-sectional data are insuﬃcient to overcome the identiﬁcation problem and
that dynamic data are indispensable. Also, as argued by Cabral and Mata (2003), it is natural to think
that researchers need to have a dynamic data set at their hands if they seriously want to investigate the
evolution of variables in relationship to ﬁrm age, independently of whether such variables are real or
ﬁnancial ones. However, having dynamic data is not suﬃcient to overcome the identiﬁcation problem.
One way to circumvent the identiﬁcation problem is to make a normalization assumption. Deaton (1997),
for example, proposes a normalization that makes the year eﬀects orthogonal to the time trend, so that
the entire eﬀect is attributed to age and cohort eﬀects. However, it is often noted that estimated results
obtained by the normalization are extremely unstable, particularly in the case of a limited time-series
horizon.
As an alternative way to cope with the identiﬁcation problem, we remove year eﬀects by subtracting
the weighted average of short- and long-term prime lending rates from Ri(t,τ), using the share of short-
and long-term borrowings outstanding at the end of each year as weights. 9
The weighted prime rate can be seen as the risk-free rate, which is basically determined by monetary
policy. In this sense, subtracting this from Ri(t,τ) amounts to removing the year eﬀect α(t) in the cost
8Recent studies in the area of consumer behavior have shown that birth cohort eﬀects are not negligible in the evolution
of various variables related to consumer decision making. Given that our sample consists of small ﬁrms with about twenty
employees on average, birth cohort eﬀects could, as in the case of consumer decision making, play a non-negligible role in
the evolution of borrowing costs.
9The procedure is as follows. First, we calculate the stock-based long- and short-term prime rates. The stock-based
long-term prime rate is deﬁned as the average of long-term prime rates over the past sixty months, while the stock-based
short-term prime rate is deﬁned as the average of short-term prime rates over the past twelve months. Second, we calculate
the weighted stock-based prime rate for individual ﬁrms, with the share of long- and short-term borrowings outstanding at
the end of each year used as weights. Third, we regress Ri(t,τ) on this weighted stock-based prime rate and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
term. We use the estimated coeﬃcient on the weighted stock-based prime rate, 0.5488 (standard error 0.0016), to calculate
adjusted borrowing costs.
7of borrowing, so that
Ri(t,τ) = β(τ) + γ(t − τ) +  i(t,τ).
Then, it is easy to see that
Ri(t + 1,τ) − Ri(t,τ) = [γ(t − τ + 1) − γ(t − τ)] +  i(t + 1,τ) −  i(t,τ),
which indicates that we identify the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the age eﬀect, although we are still not able to
identify the age eﬀect itself. Since we are mainly interested in the slope of the age proﬁle of ﬁrms in
terms of borrowing costs, the ﬁrst diﬀerence provides suﬃcient information for our purposes,10 and we
will basically adopt this method in the subsequent sections. 11
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Selection versus Adaptation
We begin our empirical analysis by looking at the age proﬁle of ﬁrms in terms of their borrowing costs.
We ﬁrst take the mean of ﬁrms’ borrowing costs and then take its ﬁrst-order time diﬀerence. That is,
we calculate
Ei∈A(t+1,τ)Ri(t + 1,τ) − Ei∈A(t,τ)Ri(t,τ), (1)
where A(t,τ) represents the set of all ﬁrms operating in year t and belonging to the birth year cohort
τ. We then regress this expression on age dummy D(a), which is equal to one if t − τ = a and is zero
otherwise. The coeﬃcient on the age dummy D(a) represents the estimate for the slope of the age proﬁle,
ˆ γ(a+1)−ˆ γ(a), which is shown in Figure 1 together with the 95% conﬁdence interval. For most ages, the
10As proposed by McKenzie (2002), one can identify second diﬀerences of the age eﬀects, [γ(t − τ + 1) − γ(t − τ)] −
[γ(t − τ) − γ(t − τ − 1)], even without any strong assumptions. However, since the second diﬀerences provide information
only about the curvature of the age proﬁle of ﬁrms in terms of their borrowing costs (and no information about its slope),
his methodology does not suit our purpose here.
11When the prime rate cannot further decrease due to the lower bound incurred, for example, by a zero interest rate,
the weighted prime rate may exaggerate the year eﬀect. This is especially the case during the periods of 1999-2000 and
2001-2006, when the Bank of Japan introduced the zero interest rate policy and the quantitative easing policy, respectively.
To examine such a possibility, shorter subsets of data for four years (1997-2000, 1998-2001, and 1999-2002) are used to
generate the slopes of age proﬁles as in Figure 2. We ﬁnd that the age proﬁle is downward sloping through all sub-samples.
8slope is signiﬁcantly negative. Next, given γ(0) = 0 as a normalization, we add b γ(1)−b γ(0), b γ(2)−b γ(1),
b γ(3) − b γ(2),... to obtain the age proﬁle presented in Figure 2, which shows important features of the
age proﬁle of ﬁrms in terms of their borrowing costs. First, the age proﬁle is signiﬁcantly downward
sloping: the diﬀerence between age 0 and age 50 is about 170 basis points. Second, it is convex: the
slope becomes smaller with age until it reaches almost zero at age 50. It is important to note that the
age proﬁle shown in Figure 2 contains two components: changes due to selection and changes due to
adaptation. To discern the relative importance of these two components, Figure 3 compares three kinds
of borrowing cost distribution: the solid line labeled “1997” represents the distribution of all ﬁrms in
1997; the broken line labeled “1997S” represents the distribution in 1997 of those ﬁrms that survived
until the end of our sample period, 2002; and the dashed line labeled “2002” represents the distribution
in 2002 of those ﬁrms that survived until 2002.
If we compare the “1997” and “2002”distributions, we can see that the “2002” distribution is less
skewed to the right, and therefore the mean of the “2002” distribution is clearly smaller, which is
consistent with the downward-sloping age proﬁle we saw in Figure 2. This raises the question where this
shift in borrowing cost distribution comes from. If we compare the “1997” and “1997S”distributions, we
see that “1997S” is slightly less skewed to the right, which implies that selection plays a role in the shift of
the borrowing cost distribution. On the other hand, if we compare the “1997S” and “2002”distributions,
we see that “2002” is again less skewed to the right, which implies that adaptation plays a role in the
shift of the distribution. However, as can be clearly seen in Figure 3, the contribution of selection in
the evolution of the distribution is much smaller than that of adaptation. Figure 4 repeats the same
exercise for each cohort and shows that (1) adaptation plays a more important role for each cohort and
(2) the relative importance of selection is smaller, particularly for younger cohorts. To examine the
relative importance of the two sources of evolution in a more robust manner, Table 3 decomposes the
total evolution of borrowing costs from year t to t + 1 into evolution due to selection and evolution due
9to adaptation. That is,






+Ei∈A(t+1,τ)Ri(t + 1,τ) − Ei∈S(t,τ)Ri(t,τ)
where S(t,τ) represents the set of ﬁrms which belong to cohort τ and survive from year t to t + 1,
D(t,τ) is the set of ﬁrms which belong to cohort τ and default in year t + 1, and θ(t,τ) is the default
rate for cohort τ in year t.12 Note that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the equation represents
the contribution of selection, while the second term represents the contribution of adaptation.
Table 3 presents the decomposition results for the whole sample as well as for six industries: con-
struction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, real estate, and services. The rows labeled “Total” represent
the left-hand side of equation (2), and the rows labeled “Selection” and “Adaptation” represent the ﬁrst
and second terms, respectively, on the right-hand side of equation (2). First, if we look at the whole
sample (the ﬁrst three rows labeled “All”), we can see that the ﬁgures for “Total” are negative for all
cohorts and that their absolute values are smaller for older generations. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the downward sloping and convex shape of the age proﬁle we saw in Figure 2. Second, the ﬁgures
in the “Selection” and “Adaptation” rows (the second and third rows) are again negative for all cohorts,
indicating that both selection and adaptation play a role in the evolution of borrowing costs. However,
if we look at the ﬁgures more closely, we see that the contribution of adaptation tends to be larger than
that of selection. For example, the average over cohorts (ﬁgures in the upper right-hand corner) shows
that the contribution of selection is about 36 percent (-0.013 out of -0.036) while that of adaptation is 64
percent (-0.023 out of -0.036).13 This conﬁrms our casual observation from Figure 3 and is also consis-
tent with empirical ﬁndings reported by Cabral and Mata (2003) for the evolution of size distribution of
12To obtain equation (2), we use the identity Ei∈S(t,τ)Ri(t,τ) − Ei∈A(t,τ)Ri(t,τ) ≡ θ(t,τ)[Ei∈S(t,τ)Ri(t,τ) −
Ei∈D(t,τ)Ri(t,τ)].
13Note that this does not necessarily imply that selection and adaptation are independent. In fact, as shown in Figure
5, there exits a positive correlation between the two, suggesting that selection and adaptation are not independent. This
correlation could be interpreted as evidence that selection facilitates adaptation, in the sense that ﬁrms try very hard to
change their attributes if they face severe selection pressure, but do not do so otherwise.
10Portuguese ﬁrms, and Okazaki (2004) for the evolution of Japanese main bank relationships.14 Third, if
we look at the ﬁgures for each industry, we see that the above three regularities hold for each industry,
except in the case of the real estate industry where borrowing costs tend to increase with age.
3.2 Natural versus Unnatural Selection
The concept of natural selection was ﬁrst applied to economics by Alchian (1950), who argued that the
economy is a system of selection where market forces eliminate ﬁrms that do not earn proﬁts. This
idea has been adopted by many researchers, including Jovanovic (1982), who modeled the selection
mechanism as ﬁrms’ learning process about their eﬃciency.
Whether the selection process works properly or not has been one of the most important empirical
issues regarding the Japanese economy in the late 1990s. Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003) and
Peek and Rosengren (2005) use ﬁrm-level data to investigate whether the selection process worked
properly for large, publicly traded ﬁrms. Using various performance indicators, including productivity,
proﬁtability, and debt ratios, to distinguish bad ﬁrms from good ones, they found that troubled banks
tended to increase (rather than decrease) loans to bad ﬁrms in order to avoid realizing losses on their
own balance sheets. They interpret this as evidence against natural selection, and Peek and Rosengren
(2005) dub this “unnatural selection.”15 Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005), moreover, found that
in some Japanese industries during the latter half of the 1990s, there was a tendency for ﬁrms with low
productivity to remain in business while those with high productivity exited. Furthermore, Caballero,
Hoshi, and Kashyap (2006) and Ahearne and Shinada (2005) argue that Japanese banks have kept
unproﬁtable ﬁrms (“zombie ﬁrms”) alive by extending loans at subsidized low interest rates, and that
14On the other hand, Baldwin and Raﬁquzzaman (1995) report that selection plays a dominant role in the evolution of
ﬁrm performance (in terms of size, productivity, wages, and proﬁtability) of young Canadian ﬁrms that have just entered
an industry. In a related context, Bergoeing et al. (2002) compare a country with a proper selection mechanism (Chile)
to one without (Mexico), and show that a proper selection process facilitates economic growth.
15Note that, in Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) study, selection, be it natural or unnatural, does not imply market exit:
unnaturally selected ﬁrms (with a poor performance) tend to increase their debts but continue to be allowed to stay in
business. Presumably, this reﬂects the fact that Peek and Rosengren’s sample is limited to publicly traded ﬁrms, which
seldomly default.
11these zombies crowd out ﬁrms with proﬁtable projects, thereby distorting the allocation of resources.
One common feature of studies along these lines is that they concentrate on large ﬁrms.16 This is
partly based on the belief that the misallocation of bank loans occurs only in the case of large ﬁrms
(see, for example, Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003)). However, there is no a priori reason to assume
that there is no unnatural selection in the case of small ﬁrms. In fact, a number of practitioners and
researchers have argued that the misallocation and mispricing of bank loans is much more serious to
small ﬁrms. Moreover, given that large parent ﬁrms and their subsidiaries are closely related in terms
of their activities, it is possible that unnatural selection in the large-ﬁrm sector has an adverse impact
on small ﬁrms. Based on this line of reasoning, the remainder of this subsection examines whether there
is any evidence of unnatural selection among small and medium-sized ﬁrms.
Natural selection implies that low-performing ﬁrms should face higher borrowing costs and are even-
tually forced to exit the market. Therefore, whether selection is natural or unnatural depends on the













where Q is a variable representing ﬁrms’ performance (a higher Q means a better performance), which
is the operating proﬁt.
Table 4 presents the results of a one-tailed t-test against the null hypothesis that equation (3) holds.
Similarly, Table 5 presents the results against the null hypothesis that equation (4) holds. These tables
show that we can reject the null hypotheses not only for the entire sample but also for almost all sub-
samples. For the entire sample, defaulters’ borrowing costs are 60 basis points higher than those of
16An exception is Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005), who use a data set containing small ﬁrms. However, the
“Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities,” from which their data are taken, includes no information
on default events, so that one cannot identify defaulters and non-defaulters in a reliable way.
12survivors, while their operating proﬁts are 2.3 percent lower. One of the few exceptions is the real estate
industry, for which we cannot reject the null hypothesis for borrowing costs, although we can safely
reject it for operating proﬁts.
To examine the relationship between selection in terms of borrowing cost and that in terms of the
performance variable, Figure 6 measures the contribution of selection for borrowing cost on the horizontal
axis and that for the performance variable on the vertical axis. As can be clearly seen, there is a negative
correlation between the two, which indicates that the lower the quality of a defaulting ﬁrm, the higher
the interest rate it is required to pay. In this sense, we fail to ﬁnd clear evidence of mispricing in credit
markets.
3.3 Age versus Size in Adaptation
We now turn to the analysis of the role of ﬁrms’ age in adaptation. Figure 7 shows the age proﬁle of
ﬁrms in terms of their borrowing costs for surviving ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we regress
Ei∈A(t+1,τ)Ri(t + 1,τ) − Ei∈S(t,τ)Ri(t,τ), (5)
on age dummies to obtain the slopes of the age proﬁle at diﬀerent ages. Note that the age proﬁle is
depicted under the normalization that the value corresponding to age 0 equals zero, as in Figure 2. If we
compare the above expression with equation (1) in section 3.1, we can see that A(t,τ) is now replaced
by S(t,τ), so that the age proﬁle depicted in Figure 7 represents the contribution of adaptation. We can
also see from Figure 7 that the age proﬁle is downward sloping and convex, as in Figure 2. Moreover,
the diﬀerence of borrowing costs between age 0 and age 50 is now 110 basis points, while it was 170
basis points in Figure 2, indicating that 60 basis points are attributable to selection.
Why do survivors’ borrowing costs decline with age? There are several hypotheses to explain this.
Diamond (1989) proposes the following. Suppose that lenders cannot directly observe the true quality
of each borrower, but can observe each borrower’s track record of repayment or default for all past
13periods. Under these circumstances, lenders price their loans based on each borrower’s history of default.
Speciﬁcally, borrowers with a good track record are likely to be ﬁrms that have access only to safe
projects. On the other hand, borrowers that have experienced default are likely to have access only to
risky projects. Based on this Bayesian inference, lenders oﬀer low interest rates to the former borrowers
and require high interest rates of the latter. The core of Diamond’s hypothesis lies in borrowers’ reaction
to this pricing policy. Firms that only have access to risky projects have no alternative but to choose
risky projects, so they do not change their behavior. However, ﬁrms with access to both of safe and
risky projects have a stronger incentive to choose safe projects rather than risky ones, simply because
they correctly recognize that they can enjoy the beneﬁts of low interest rates in the present and future
periods simply by avoiding a default. Importantly, the longer a ﬁrm’s history of no default, the stronger
is its incentive to choose safe projects. This implies ﬁrms become more and more risk averse as they age,
and consequently they are required to pay lower and lower interest rates. This is Diamond’s reputation
story.
In the reputation story, each ﬁrm’s track record of repayment or default plays an important role
as a “state variable”: ﬁrms change their choice among projects as they age simply because the state
variable evolves over time. However, ﬁrms’ credit history is not the only state variable we can think of.
In fact, the literature on ﬁrm dynamics highlights the role of ﬁrm size as a state variable.17 Hopenhayn
(1992), for instance, introduces persistent productivity shocks in his model and ﬁnds that size is the
only source of heterogeneity, that is, ﬁrms of the same size follow the same dynamics independent of
their age. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) introduce a model with ﬁnancial frictions and i.i.d. productivity
shocks, and conclude that ﬁrms’ characteristics, such as default probability, are dependent on size
but are independent of age once size is controlled for. According to their model, a marginal increase
in ﬁrm size as measured by net worth, leads to an increase in the volatility of proﬁts, which has a
negative impact on the ﬁrm’s value because of ﬁnancial frictions. On the other hand, due to diminishing
17For example, Evans (1987a) and Hall (1987) provide empirical evidence that ﬁrms’ growth rate and the volatility of
growth are negatively correlated with ﬁrm size.
14returns, as the ﬁrm’s size increases, the marginal expected proﬁts from further increases in size decrease.
Consequently, the ﬁrm becomes more concerned about the volatility of proﬁts as it grows to a larger
size, and borrows less relative to its equity. This leads to a decline in the probability of default and,
presumably, to a decline in borrowing costs. Given that ﬁrm size is positively correlated with ﬁrm age,
such a correlation between ﬁrm size and borrowing costs implies a negative association between ﬁrm age
and borrowing costs. However, this spurious correlation between borrowing costs and age disappears
once size is controlled for.
Thus the question arises: which of the two factors, ﬁrm age or ﬁrm size, plays a more important role
as a state variable? Is the observed correlation between ﬁrm age and borrowing costs merely spurious,
reﬂecting the relationship between the true state variable, i.e., ﬁrm size, and borrowing costs? To address
this issue, we obtain the age proﬁle of ﬁrms in terms of their borrowing costs conditional on ﬁrm size.
First, we plot how ﬁrm size evolves over a ﬁrm’s life cycle, which is shown in Figure 8. We employ
natural log values of total assets and net worth outstanding as proxies for ﬁrm size of survivors and ﬁnd
that both of the variables increase with ﬁrms’ age. 18
Next, we regress
Ei∈A(t+1,τ,size)Ri(t + 1,τ,size) − Ei∈S(t,τ,size)Ri(t,τ,size) (6)
on age and size dummies to obtain the slopes of the age proﬁle. For the size dummies, we divide the
entire sample into four categories either in terms of total assets or net worth outstanding. The results are
shown in Figure 9. Note that the lines in the ﬁgure are all drawn using the normalization that the value
corresponding to age 0 equals zero, so that the slope of each line is the only meaningful information one
can read from the ﬁgure. The ﬁgure shows that the age proﬁles conditional on ﬁrm size are all downward
sloping. More importantly, their slopes, measured by the diﬀerence in borrowing costs between age 0 and
age 50, are steeper when size is controlled for. If the downward sloping age proﬁle is entirely generated
18Before taking logs, all observations of net worth are normalized to become non- negative by adding the absolute value
of the minimum observation.
15by the causality via ﬁrm size (i.e., ﬁrm age → ﬁrm size → borrowing cost), a signiﬁcantly smaller slope
should be observed when ﬁrm size is controlled for. However, as far as Figure 9 is concerned, we observe
obviously downward-sloping age proﬁles in terms of the steepness of the slopes, implying that one cannot
reject the null hypothesis that ﬁrm age is an independent determinant of borrowing costs.
Note, however, that Diamond’s reputation story is not the only explanation that would be consistent
with our ﬁnding. Another possible explanation is provided by the literature on relationship banking.
Studies in this ﬁeld suggest that bank-borrower relationships lubricate the value-enhancing exchange of
information (in particular, private information revealing borrowers’ true quality), and that the longer
the duration of the relationship, the greater the information exchange (see, for example, Petersen and
Rajan (1994) and Boot and Thakor (1995)). Empirical evidence supporting this argument is provided
by Berger and Udell (1995), among others. Importantly, given that the duration of ﬁrms’ relationship
with a creditor is closely related with their age, this argument could explain the downward-sloping age
proﬁle. An important diﬀerence from the reputation story is that surviving ﬁrms do not change their
behavior as they age. Instead, lenders change their pricing behavior over time as they learn about the
true quality of their customers. Another possible explanation is provided by Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
and has been dubbed the “ﬁrm dynamics hypothesis.” This hypothesis suggests that size is not the only
dimension of heterogeneity but that a combination of ﬁnancial frictions and persistent productivity
shocks has independent age eﬀects on ﬁrms’ characteristics.
Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to test the three diﬀerent hypotheses addressed here - the reputation, the
relationship banking, and the ﬁrm dynamics hypothesis - against each other, partly because they are not
necessarily mutually exclusive and partly because necessary data are not available. However, indirect
evidence exists that suggests that the reputation story provides the most likely explanation. Figure 10
documents the development of ﬁrms’ proﬁtability among survivors, that is, how the adaptation channel
functions in terms of ﬁrms’ quality. This age proﬁle of ﬁrms in terms of their proﬁtability is obviously
upward sloping, which suggests the following two things. First, since the proﬁtability measure is based
16on business proﬁts before interest payments are subtracted, we interpret the increase in proﬁtability
with ﬁrm age as the result of behavioral changes by surviving ﬁrms themselves rather than by ﬁnancial
institutions. This contrasts with the relationship banking hypothesis, in which not ﬁrms but lenders
change their behavior, that is, their pricing policy. Second, our empirical ﬁnding that younger ﬁrms are
less proﬁtable than older ones seems to contradict one of the crucial assumptions of the ﬁrm dynamics
hypothesis, namely, that new entrants are more productive than incumbents. Once the assumption on
entrants’ productivity is violated, this theoretical prediction points to a positive age proﬁle of borrowing
costs rather than a negative one, which again is in contradiction with our empirical ﬁndings. In sum,
the increasing proﬁtability with ﬁrm age (for surviving ﬁrms) is more likely to be in conﬂict with the
relationship banking and ﬁrm dynamics hypotheses than with the reputation hypothesis.
4 Conclusion
This study examined three empirical questions regarding the relationship between ﬁrm age and the
evolution of ﬁrms’ borrowing costs, using a unique panel data set of more than 200,000 small Japanese
ﬁrms for the period 1997-2002. The ﬁrst question we addressed was whether selection plays a dominant
role in the evolution of borrowing costs. The literature on ﬁrm dynamics has emphasized the role of
selection in the evolution of ﬁrm size, and we were interested in whether selection also plays a role in
the evolution of ﬁnancial variables such as borrowing costs. We found that selection can explain about
one-third of the total evolution of borrowing costs, indicating that selection plays an important, but
not dominant role in the evolution of borrowing costs. The remaining two-thirds are explained by the
decline in the borrowing costs of surviving ﬁrms as they age. This ﬁnding is in line with results of recent
empirical studies on ﬁrm dynamics, such as Cabral and Mata (2003) and Okazaki (2004).
ɹThe second question we addressed was whether the selection we found was natural or unnatural. It
has been suggested that one important reason for Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation is that zombie
17ﬁrms were allowed to stay in the market because of the perverse incentives provided by struggling
banks and that the presence of such zombie ﬁrms crowded out new entrants with proﬁtable investment
opportunities. To examine whether this argument is supported by our data, we looked at diﬀerences
between prospective defaulters and survivors in terms of their borrowing costs and proﬁts focusing on
six industries. We found that defaulters tended to perform worse and pay higher interest rates than
survivors, with the exception of the real estate industry where defaulting ﬁrms paid lower borrowing
costs than survivors. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence of unnatural selection, at least among small ﬁrms, which
contrasts with Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) results for large, publicly traded ﬁrms. Considering the fact
that the majority of bank loans by Japanese banks are allocated to small and medium enterprises, the
relevance of natural selection among small businesses should be more pronounced.
The third question we considered concerns the mechanism through which surviving ﬁrms’ borrowing
costs decline as they age. We examined the possibility that this age dependence is the result of a causal
chain via ﬁrm size (i.e., ﬁrm age → ﬁrm size → borrowing costs), but found a similar regularity even
when we controlled for ﬁrm size. While a number of other potential explanations have been suggested,
such as the role of relationship banking and ﬁrm dynamics, Diamond’s reputation hypothesis continues
to provide the most plausible explanation.
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21Table 1: Number of Observations
Year All Surviving Defaulting Default
Firms Firms Firms Ratio (%)
1997 240,384 232,811 7,573 3.150
1998 232,811 224,005 8,806 3.782
1999 224,005 215,404 8,601 3.840
2000 215,404 208,644 6,760 3.138
2001 208,644 203,337 5,307 2.544
2002 203,337 203,337
Total 1,324,585 1,287,538 37,047 2.797
Table 2: Summary Statistics
All Firms Surviving Firms Defaulting Firms
Mean Mean Mean
Variables: Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
Borrowing Cost (%) 2.83 2.82 3.45
(1.22) (1.21) (1.63)
Prime Rate (%) 2.38 2.38 2.42
(0.59) (0.59) (0.54)
Age 23.16 23.27 19.75
(13.44) (13.44) (12.92)
Assets (1,000 Yen) 594,550 600,352 389,908
(1,113,733) (1,119,771) (849,531)
Net Worth (1,000 Yen) 89,469 91,745 9,243
(220,152) (222,121) (105,674)
Number of Employees 23.87 24.18 12.94
(35.27) (35.54) (21.40)
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Figure 8: Evolution of Firm Size: Surviving Firms
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Figure 9: Age Proﬁle of Borrowing Costs Controlled by Size: Surviving Firms
Notes:
1. Dotted lines are the age proﬁle of borrowing costs controlled by size.
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